Iran War 2026 and the Controlled Demolition of the Middle East
Why US Strategic Aims are Satisfied Regardless or Who Actually Wins
As of this writing, it is now 20 days since the United States and Israel attacked Iran and kicked off a protracted, standoff-weapons-driven conflict that has now turned primarily to the destruction of energy production and transmission, as well as the otherwise broad discouragement of travel to the Middle East (a non-irregular occurrence).
The Trump Administration, in attacking Iran, has exhibited the same general tendency it has in most of its foreign policy decision-making - that is to say that in domains where it has complete discretion and is unshackled by Congress (as has been the case for the Imperial Presidency for nearly 80 years now), Trump and his advisors opt for scenarios that present asymmetric upside: aggressive control of Greenland, deposing Maduro while maintaining the regime itself, aggressive tariffs whether they are legal or not, and opportunistic multilateralism (board of Peace, Gaza reinvestment and so on) that promotes the general acquisitiveness of the US establishment while not paying much attention to norms, rules or new first principles as established.
In attacking Iran - whether it was truly motivated by an attempt to pre-empt Israel (as Marco Rubio indicated) or not - the Trump administration is extending it’s desire to reorganize global energy production around an exclusively US-driven framework while playing both sides of the actual price of energy.
If Iran were to acquiesce to US coercion and bring forward a more liberal, moderate regime focused on economic integration, energy prices would go down and global growth would continue to accelerate.
If Iran resists and protests - causing disruption by targeting oil and LNG facilities in the Gulf States, not simply trying to respond directly at Israel - the cost of energy skyrockets and that facilitates further US shale exploitation and greater export volume from the United States, and perhaps also gives enough economic incentive to US oil conglomerates to meaningfully redevelop Venezuela and further drive US control and capacity up while the rest of the world’s energy capacity could enter a chaotic and possibly terminal decline.
There are moments in the history of the United States which help define its movement forward as a political, cultural and economic force. The Declaration of Independence, the Emancipation Proclamation, the Yalta Conference - these are all milestones on a road of seemingly continuous ascension. It is hard to say that whatever is happening now actually matches these events, but in a historical sequence, they are fairly evenly spaced. The prospect of the United States cornering the global energy supply - not only to curb China, but to bring Europe and other casual allies to heel - can equate to a new founding moment that will embolden the state with more absolute control, more opportunity to “create its own reality”, to borrow a phrase from Karl Rove, on a global scale that has never previously existed.
This pursuit of asymmetric upside means that no one nation can stop it, and no assemblage of “middle powers” is likely to assuage it. There perhaps only remains a “Russian exception”, by way of their nuclear deterrent, developed when they themselves were a superpower, in some ways facilitated only by lend-lease from the United States. Other states remain, but their standard of living is too dependent on the United States as the center of the global economic system - whether that is China, India, Europe, Pakistan or even North Korea by extension of the Chinese system.
In this context, it is important to remember the other half of Rubio’s rationalization, which cited the extensive missile capacity of Iran, but limited launcher capacity, while a surprise campaign could denude their launch capability no matter their actual missile inventory. Waiting to the last possible moment before Iran developed a strategic advantage is another sign of hyperpower - simply put, when an adversary is close to developing a capability you mistrust, you not only remove that capability, but also their ability to furnish such capabilities in the future. Even if Iran maintains launchers, they can be fewer, further between, and more easy to identify when positioned for launch even as they are driven more deeply underground.
At this time, even China is primarily interested in second-strike nuclear capability. They are not strategically positioned to pursue conflict, despite all their progress, and hence seek only to avoid it by appearing strong but feigning weakness when conflict comes about. They are, like the Europeans, unable to gather the physical capability or political will to involve themselves in the current Middle East conflict, despite having their energy sorer for the taking there too.
The United States will only benefit from troops on the ground for the sake of proving it still maintains military preeminence and no longer lacks the post-GWOT fear to act - same as was the case for “Vietnam Syndrome” or the comfort that overtook the nation in the Post-WWII period. No other nation on Earth fights out of a willingness to prove inconvenient to its enemies, the only nations that fight seem to be those whose survival are at risk, and even in those cases, much of the populace (including Iran’s) seems to retain a “come what may” attitude towards the downside.