Strategic Competition as a Feature of Civilizational Decline
Why "The Thucydides Trap" Only Tells Part of the Story
Strategic competition has been a feature of human behavior since the beginning of time. The development of strategy comes from multi-participant systems, whether within tribes, between them, or between multiple parties in a contained geographic scope. This is observed not only in humans but primates, birds, gazelles, wolves and pretty well everywhere in the biologically known universe that is planet Earth.
While strategic competition today is in an active apex with the jostling between the United States and China for world supremacy, the reality of the situation brings out a historical oddity which may or may not be pleasant to hear: the strategic competition between the United States and China is a competition of which state can decline at the least rapid rate.
Strategic Competition and the Thucydides Trap
From an objective point of view, this is the same thing as saying “who looks to rise the fastest and stay there”. But exceptions remain. The historian Graham Allison achieved some notoriety for his discussion of “The Thucydides Trap” in 2011 and ultimately published a book explaining it further in 2017.
This term draws inspiration from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, which described in great detail the conflict between Athens and Sparta from approximately 430-400 B.C., in which the two states - differing greatly in social structure and political economy - wrestled for control of the broader Greek world in that time.
Thucydides portrayed this conflict as inevitable, not necessarily because the two states were defined in opposition to one another, had differing beliefs or ideologies, or were intent on extracting or subjugating each other in a battle for total control. In fact, Thucydides assumed that these two states would simply face an eventual conflict for hegemony over the region because of their inability and disinterest in integrating, which one could assume was driven by their elites.
Even more importantly to recall, from this historical example, is that Athens and Sparta had been allies (not the best of allies, but allies nonetheless) in the Greco-Persian wars of ~500-450 B.C. Hence, not 20 years after the resolution of that conflict and the return of stability to the Greek world, conflict emerged out of the development of stability, peace and trade, up to a point where the parties involved faced too many contradictions - between both each other and their trading allies - that precipitated a formal conflict.
The point of this article is not to criticize Graham Allison or divine the real intentions of Thucydides’ texts, but instead portray what is often perceived as a rising power vs static or declining power conflict into an argument over two powers that are declining in different ways and at different rates.
The Case Against China
At a glance, China seems to be the rising power. Its manufacturing dominance, infrastructure projects, surveillance state, and state-driven investment machine have created a global image of discipline and long-term ambition, but much of this progress belies a disturbing malaise. China’s population is set to decline by hundreds of millions by 2100, the legacy of a one-child population control policy along with unremitting “9-9-6” working conditions and a younger generation that - desperate all the so-called prosperity - is increasing seeking to “lie flat”.
In financial markets, the Evergrande collapse along with the continuing instability of its real-estate-dependent growth model are effectively leaving the country internally insolvent. Some question that the frequency of Chinese citizens buying land in the United States is not necessarily for some nefarious military purpose, but instead that they are simply looking for good places to park their money, because all the good real estate in China has run out.
While China is advancing by leaps and bounds in military and technological capabilities, the vast majority of its agricultural goods and animal feed are imported from overseas. China’s domestic agricultural production is already input-intensive - inputs it cannot extract by imperial ambition (Co-Prosperity Sphere 2.0, anyone?) because it cannot even project power beyond the Taiwan Straight in any reliable manner.
China has fuelled domestic growth through export to international markets. It is definitively dependent on the international system as it is to maintain what prosperity it has. It is a savings-driven country with few social benefits and persistent rural poverty, environmental issues and infrastructure challenges - just imagine the cost of maintaining the overbuilt infrastructure it developed to reach this level of growth.
Ultimately, it’s a powerful country, but it lacks the components to achieve a differentiated level of long-term growth and development, independent of security concerns.
The Case Against the United States
The United States is in the third part of the Tetrad of the Cycle of Empire. What this means is that it has achieved unparalleled prosperity but is now seeing a meaningful decline in both it’s relative position globally and it’s standard of living at home. It is still top dog, but it is tired.
This is effectively portrayed by the fact that a bumbling real estate mogul with the phrase “Make America Great Again” as his campaign slogan has won two of the last three presidential elections, and arguably would have won the second in place if it weren’t for a once-in-a-century pandemic. Yes Mussolini was bad, but Mussolini would’ve also been pretty impressed - after all, he’s doing this in the context of a still barely-functioning electoral system.
Take your pick of America’s rolling social crises, addictions and general pearl-clutching, but the ultimate challenge is that Congress cannot stop spending money in spite of itself. Mandatory Entitlements, Defense Spending and Interest on Debt make up nearly 80% of federal spending, meaning legally the country can’t spend less money even if it wanted to (pretty well what we just witnessed with DOGE).
In this context, it still has relatively favorable demographics, a strong Christian community with messianic optimism about the purpose of their country on Earth, and the ability to project power globally at a whim, despite the need for more cost-effective equipment. But if it cannot wrangle social spending which is already perceived as insufficient despite it’s actual costs, if it cannot unwind its empire upon which it is effectively dependent for what income it has, if it cannot restore social cohesion without people crying about racism, sexism, unfair distribution or whatnot, then you basically don’t have a country, you have an insolvency walking around like its Fort Knox.
Maybe America will change somewhat, but it will require a return to the kind of social compact that built the country - one where you get basically nothing except by the sweat of your brow - and most modern Americans would find that essentially unacceptable.
Two Great Powers Struggling to Keep their Heads Above Water
What unites both nations is their inability to meaningfully renew themselves. In neither country does the public truly believe the future will be better than the past.
This is perhaps the most damning indicator of decline: a collapse in optimism. No civilizational rejuvenation can occur without a collective belief that progress is possible. Technological progress, national pride, social reform—none of it matters without a populace willing to fight for it. Some may contradict this with polling data, but the birth rates tell a different tale.
The U.S. and China are locked in what appears to be a great power competition, but is actually is a mutual defensive crouch. Both are trying to preserve a system—economic, political, cultural—that is no longer delivering widespread gains. Both are hoping that the other falls first. Neither is investing in the future with the confidence of an ascending power.
Perhaps, in fact, what we could be witnessing in current trade negotiations, is much like two aging fighters who must extend their match in order to get paid: holding each other up, delivering strategic blows to maintain the believability of conflict but avoid the actual costs of either of them really trying to take out the other. If the developing world were to observe this up close, most nations would be unlikely to take either party seriously unless money is literally thrown at them - seemingly this is the case today.
And more glaringly, we can assume that one does not engages in strategic competition if all is well. This means, if one is a rising power that continues to grow, one may partake in opportunistic competition in order to continue that good performance, but when one is forced to engage in strategy, it typically implies that one has reached the upper limits of generic growth-driven expansion which otherwise typifies a rising power.
Demographic Quiet and the Apparent Absence of a Rising Power
Optimism is one of the most critical forces that drives powers to rise. Much like in individual life, if one does not believe things can get better, one will not take action to do so. In the current arrangement of global affairs, what countries believe things are actually getting better?
Most of these countries where this could perceived to be the case do so with relative moderation: perhaps parts of central Europe, wealthier segments of the middle east, the bulk of southeast Asia, pockets of Latin America, and Nigeria and various pockets of the African Continent.
Are any of these nations developed enough to contest China or the United States in terms of trade, industrial development or the projection of military power? Most certainly not. But do they have expanding population basis, increased access to healthcare and education, strong social and community bonds that can eventually drive stronger institutional development and coherence, and the feeling of an optimistic improvement in the standard of living, even if starting from a relatively low base? The answer is mostly: yes, actually.
In civilizational and historical cycles, these sorts of transitions don’t happen in 50 or 100 years, but 200 or 500. Much as the underlying economy of Ancient Rome was hollowed out over many centuries before the core institutions of the Roman System, so to could this be the case for the United States, and even for instance for the modern Chinese state - CCP driven or otherwise.
As such, while conflict persists between the current global hegemon and a hegemon-in-waiting, the reality is that neither country is growing fast enough to exceed in any substantially manner its current debts, liabilities and imperial obligations. Quoting Vladimir Putin could be considered passe in a couple years time, but eventually you “run out of necklaces”.